California State Transportation Agency
October 22, 2018
Elaine M. Howle, California State Auditor
California State Auditor's Office
621 Capitol Mall, Suite 1200
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Ms. Howle:
Attached please find a response from the California High-Speed Rail Authority (Authority) to your draft audit report (#2018-108) issued October 15, 2018. Thank you for allowing the Authority and the California State Transportation Agency (CalSTA) the opportunity to respond to the report.
From the outset, CalSTA and the Authority’s new Chief Executive Officer and executive management team welcomed your audit and now appreciates your identification of opportunities for improvement. Accordingly, the Authority concurs with all recommendations in the report and either already has taken steps toward implementing them or has established timelines to do so.
If you need additional information regarding the Authority’s response, please do not hesitate to contact Michael Tritz, CalSTA Deputy Secretary for Audits and Performance Improvement, at (916) 324-7517.
Sincerely,
BRIAN C. ANNIS
Secretary
Attachment
cc: Brian P. Kelly, Chief Executive Officer, California High-Speed Rail Authority
California High-Speed Rail Authority
October 22, 2018
Brian Annis, Secretary
California State Transportation Agency
915 Capitol Mall, Suite 350-B
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Secretary Annis:
The California High-Speed Rail Authority (Authority) appreciates the opportunity to respond to the California State Auditor (CSA) draft audit report issued on October 15, 2018. The CSA conducted this audit at the request of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. The audit’s scope addressed the efficiency and efficacy of the policies and practices employed by the Authority. We concur with and will work to implement the CSA’s recommendations as an integral part of the Authority’s commitment to excellence and continuous improvement. We are pleased to report that we have begun implementing these and other corrective actions to remedy the issues identified.
The Authority is making progress on delivering the California high-speed rail system. The Authority’s challenge has been to evolve its organization and improve its program management processes, while concurrently delivering this complex mega-program. We are working to meet this challenge through a continuous improvement process by which we methodically and regularly identify and apply lessons learned. Through this ongoing process, we are taking systematic steps to expedite the Authority’s transition to a more rigorous program management and delivery organization. This evolution included establishing new governance structures in mid-2017 -- that we further strengthened in 2018 -- to more effectively manage the program through highly structured configuration management and change processes.
To advance and expedite this organizational transition, the Board of Directors recruited new leadership in 2017. The Board appointed me as the Authority’s Chief Executive Officer and my tenure began in February 2018. I was joined immediately thereafter by two newly appointed senior executives I selected to support me in leading this organization – a new Chief Operating Officer and a Chief Deputy Director. Those individuals brought specific skill sets in construction and program delivery and in administrative management. Together, we and the rest of the senior executive team take the audit’s recommendations seriously.
My senior executive team has reviewed the audit and is working with staff to address the CSA’s recommendations. This will include conducting root cause analyses and implementing additional corrective actions beyond the audit’s recommendations, if necessary. We regard this as an opportunity to further solidify the systemic improvements that the Authority has continued to establish and that we have strengthened over the last year.
Also, the CSA’s audit coincides with the Authority’s development of three key foundational governance documents that are essential to our ongoing process of continuous improvement. First, in May 2018, the Board of Directors adopted the 2018 Business Plan, which lays out the Authority’s implementation strategy for delivering California high-speed rail. Second, in June, the Board adopted our 2018 Program Baseline, which is an essential management document that outlines the scope, schedule and budget for the Authority Program’s early delivery objectives. Third, in October 2018 we finalized our Project Management Plan (PMP), which clarifies our integrated organizational framework and presents a governance structure stressing program management and delivery.
As detailed below, we are actively addressing the audit’s recommendations through implementation and other remedial steps. As it has done in the past, the Authority will move swiftly to fully implement the recommendations of the State Auditor that bear on the efficacy of program delivery. We hope and trust that our rapid implementation of these recommendations will bolster confidence in the Authority’s commitment to active management and continuous improvement of this most important program.
The CSA recommendations and the Authority’s responses (in bold) are as follows:
Chapter 1:
The Authority’s Decision to Begin Construction Before Completing Proper Planning Led to Cost Overruns and Delays
1. | To ensure that the change orders it approves are necessary and that their costs are appropriate, the Authority should adhere to the guidance and estimates the oversight firms provide to it. If the Authority chooses to deviate from the oversight firms’ recommendations, it should clearly document why it made those deviations. Response: |
2. | Before executing its next construction contract, the Authority should establish formal prerequisites for beginning construction to prevent avoidable cost overruns and project delays. At a minimum, these prerequisites should identify specific benchmarks related to land acquisition, utility agreements and relocations, and agreements with external stakeholders, including impacted local governments and other railroad operators. Response: More specifically, the Business Oversight Committee considers benchmarks prior to progressing to procurement or to the next phase of project delivery. For example, the Business Oversight Committee would consider the progress of pre-construction activities, including right-of-way acquisition, prior to approving procurement activities to select a construction contractor. Further, delivering projects in accordance with the Program Baseline, which was adopted by the Board of Directors in June 2018, also ensures that certain predecessor tasks (or prerequisites) are sufficiently advanced prior to beginning construction, as the Baseline incorporates the lessons learned outlined in the 2018 Business Plan. The Authority continues to develop Baseline project work plans composed of discretely defined tasks. These tasks are linked together based on project delivery sequencing, which establishes what tasks must be completed prior to beginning other tasks (i.e., predecessor tasks and successor tasks). |
3. | To better position itself to complete the three Central Valley projects by the December 2022 federal grant deadline, the Authority should improve its monitoring and evaluation of the oversight firms’ risk assessment processes and should take steps to ensure that these processes are consistent across the three projects by May 2019. Response: |
4. | To enable policymakers and the public to track the Authority’s progress toward meeting the federal grant deadline of December 2022, the Authority should, by January 2019, begin providing quarterly updates to the Legislature detailing the progress of the three Central Valley construction projects using an earned value model that compares construction progress to the projected total completion cost and date. The Authority should base these updates on the most current cost estimates available. Response: |
5. | To ensure that it is adequately prepared if it is unable to meet the federal grant deadline of December 2022, the Authority should, by May 2019, develop a contingency plan for responding to such a scenario. Response: |
Chapter 2:
The Authority Has Not Successfully Enforced the Policies It Implemented to Address Ongoing Deficiencies With Its Contract Management
1. | To improve its contract management, increase accountability, and justify the significant amount it pays for contracted services, the Authority should take the following steps by May 2019:.
Response:
Response: In addition, the Authority concurs that CMSU should be composed of state staff. The Authority will prepare a Budget Change Proposal for the 2020/21 fiscal year to request staff augmentation to remove contracted Rail Delivery Partner (RDP) consultants and replace with state employees.
Response: Planned completion date: The Authority will begin performing assessments of contract managers no later than November 2018 and anticipates that all contract manager assessments will be completed by or before November 2020 and be ongoing thereafter. |
2. | To prevent the inappropriate use of contractors to perform state functions, the Authority should develop procedures by May 2019 for evaluating whether new or existing administrative duties should be assigned to contractors or to state employees. Response: |
3. | To ensure the completeness of contract managers’ invoice reviews and that invoiced costs are allowable under contract terms, the Authority should amend its applicable procedures by May 2019 to require contract managers to document their review of invoiced rates and expenses. Response: |
4. | To ensure the consistency and effectiveness of its efforts to monitor the performance of the oversight firms with which it contracts, the Authority should develop a formal methodology by May 2019 for using the performance evaluation tool it has implemented. This methodology should include procedures for assessing the sufficiency of the oversight firms’ review and approval for construction contracts. Response: |
5. | To ensure oversights firms’ spending is reasonable, the Authority should develop a formal process by May 2019, for tracking any out-of-scope work the oversight firms perform. To reduce the likelihood that its contracts with these oversight firms run out of funds prematurely as a result of this additional work, the Authority should also develop a formal process for amending these oversight firm’s contracts contemporaneous to change orders that significantly extend timelines or increase the scope of work of the construction contracts that they oversee. Response: |
Chapter 3:
The Authority Can Improve the Quality and Transparency of Its Monitoring and Reporting for Key Goals
1. | To help improve the effectiveness of its sustainability policy, the Authority should revise the policy by May 2019 to more clearly differentiate between construction and operation phases of the high-speed rail system. Further, it should ensure that each objective in each section of the policy is associated with quantifiable metrics for evaluating implementation. Response: |
2. | To allow it to evaluate the sustainability of the high-speed rail system’s construction, the Authority should perform and document a review of its compliance with its existing quality controls related to ensuring the validity and completeness of contractor-reported data by May 2019. The Authority should also establish a formal process to perform such reviews periodically. Response: |
3. | To help ensure it meets its sustainability goals, the Authority should comprehensively compare the three construction project’s performance to their construction contractors’ original baseline estimates on a quarterly basis by May 2019. Response: |
4. | To help ensure that its contractors proposed environmental impacts are reasonable and to measure the progress of its sustainable construction efforts over time, the Authority should, by November 2019, identify and track standardized measure – such as project miles – that will allow it to compare construction impacts across the high-speed rail system’s different construction projects. Response: |
5. | To increase the transparency of its reporting, the Authority should, by May 2019, expand its quarterly small business, DBVE, and DBE utilization reporting to account for the total value of all its contracts and to identify the reasons it has exempted specific contracts. Response: |
Again, we appreciate the opportunity to provide a response to our plans to implement the California State Auditor’s recommendations. If you have any questions, please contact Paula Rivera, Chief Auditor, at paula.rivera@hsr.ca.gov or (916) 403-2679
Sincerely,
JD Hedges
for Brian P. Kelly
Chief Executive Officer
Comments
CALIFORNIA STATE AUDITOR’S COMMENTS ON THE RESPONSE FROM THE CALIFORNIA HIGH‑SPEED RAIL AUTHORITY
To provide clarity and perspective, we are commenting on the Authority's response to the audit. The numbers below correspond to the numbers we have placed in the margin of its response.
Although the Authority states that the Business Oversight Committee (BOC) considers benchmarks prior to progressing to procurement or the next phase of project delivery, this committee, which the Authority established in September 2017, has not yet overseen the procurement of a construction contractor. As Figure 6 shows, the Authority executed the most recent of its three construction contracts—for Project 4—in 2016. Therefore, any oversight the committee provides regarding key preconstruction activities is still prospective.
As we discuss here, the Authority's recently released comprehensive schedule delineates that early work tasks, such as land acquisition, should begin before the design and construction phase. However, the schedule does not establish specific benchmarks the Authority must achieve before procuring a construction contractor. Therefore, to avoid cost overruns and delays from moving to the construction phase too soon, as our recommendation specifies, the Authority should establish formal prerequisites for beginning construction and these prerequisites should identify specific benchmarks related to land acquisition, utility agreements and relocations, and agreements with external stakeholders.
As we state here, CMSU's oversight of contract management policies and procedures has been weak and inconsistent. We also explain here that placing oversight responsibility with RDP consultants creates a potential conflict of interest. However, under the Authority's proposed approach, it would not have funding for state employees to staff CMSU until at least July 2020. Given the issues we found and the amount of public funds at stake, we believe the Authority should move faster to secure professional state staff to perform CMSU's crucial oversight duties.
We state here that as of September 2018, the Authority's 56 contract managers were collectively responsible for 204 contracts. Although we recognize the amount of work necessary to hold each contract manager accountable for each of their assigned contracts, we do not believe the State can afford for the Authority to take two years to complete its assessments of contract managers, as its response indicates. Additionally, we encourage the Authority to focus its initial efforts not only on the contracts identified in this audit but also its other largest and highest risk contracts.
The Authority's response does not specify whether its methodology for evaluating its PCMs—which we refer to in our report as construction oversight firms (oversight firms)—will include procedures for assessing the sufficiency of the oversight firms' reviews and approvals of invoices for construction contracts. As we state in our recommendation, such procedures are important to ensure consistency and the effectiveness of the Authority's efforts to monitor the performance of the oversight firms with which it contracts. Therefore, the Authority should include these procedures in its methodology.
The Authority states that any oversight firm contract amendment requires approval by the BOC. However, we identified concerns with an oversight firm contract amendment that the Authority approved in March 2018. Specifically, as we describe here, the Authority's documents assert that the amendment stemmed from it assigning work to the oversight firm that was outside the original contract. However, the contract manager was unable to tell us the amount of funding that went to the oversight firm for this out‑of‑scope work and acknowledged that he had not documented the oversight firm's adequate performance. Therefore, until the Authority implements our recommendation to track any out‑of‑scope work that oversight firms perform, the Authority, including its BOC, will not know whether the oversight firms' spending rates are reasonable or if amendments are appropriate.
We appreciate that the Authority is taking steps to match existing sustainability policy objectives with quantitative metrics in its implementation plan. However, our recommendation is that the Authority first revise its sustainability policy to more clearly differentiate between construction and operation phases of the system, a process we would expect to generate new policy goals and objectives. At that point, the Authority should reevaluate its implementation plan to ensure that the plan contains appropriate metrics for those new policy objectives.
Although the Authority asserts that it improved its environmental and sustainability data gathering and analysis system in July 2017, the Authority's sustainability director confirmed during our audit that the Authority was still in the process of collecting and reviewing sustainability data for calendar year 2017 and that the transition to this system was still ongoing. Additionally, the Authority's response describes quality control measures for the new data system, but these measures are not fundamentally different from those that were in place under the previous system. We describe our concerns with the accuracy of the data here.
The Authority's assertion that it has completed these comparisons since 2015 is inconsistent with the evidence it provided during our audit. During the audit, the Authority's sustainability director confirmed for us that the Authority was beginning the process of comparing actual sustainability impacts to contractor estimates, but that the Authority did not expect to have preliminary findings until the end of 2018. The Authority also provided documentation showing that some comparisons were underway. However, as we state here, our expert observed that this documentation does not allow the Authority to effectively project whether contractors will meet or exceed their estimates because it does not account for actual construction progress to date. We also state here we also state that documentation did not include equivalent comparisons related to the environmental impacts from waste or water use. Therefore, we stand by our recommendation that the Authority should comprehensively compare the three construction projects' performances to their original baseline estimates on a quarterly basis, and it should begin doing so no later than May 2019.