Skip Repetitive Navigation Links

Employment Development Department
Significant Weaknesses in EDD’s Approach to Fraud Prevention Have Led to
Billions of Dollars in Improper Benefit Payments

Report Number: 2020-628.2


The Employment Development Department (EDD) is responsible for administering the State’s unemployment insurance (UI) program, which provides partial wage replacement benefits to eligible Californians who have become unemployed, including those affected by the COVID‑19 pandemic (pandemic). Since the surge in pandemic‑related California unemployment claims began in March 2020, individuals, news organizations, and law enforcement officials have reported many cases of potential and actual UI fraud. Not surprisingly, the pandemic conditions increased EDD’s UI workloads and also resulted in changes to federal UI benefit programs, both of which have created a greater risk of fraud. We assessed EDD’s response to increased fraud risk during the pandemic—such as allegations of impostor fraud, which occurs when a perpetrator uses someone else’s personal information to fraudulently collect benefits—and evaluated its overall efforts to detect fraud. This report draws the following conclusions:

EDD’s Fraud Prevention Approach During the Pandemic Was Marked by Significant Missteps and Inaction

EDD did not take action to bolster its fraud detection efforts until months into the pandemic. As a result, its data show that it paid about $10.4 billion in claims that it has since determined may be fraudulent. Even as late as December 2020, EDD was allowing claimants to continue to collect benefits using suspicious addresses because it did not establish payment blocks for their claims. Further, $1 billion of the $10.4 billion paid for suspicious claims was the result of EDD’s decision to remove a key safeguard against payment to claimants whose identities it had not confirmed. EDD staff misunderstood the importance of that particular safeguard and, from April to August 2020, made payments to claimants despite concerns about the legitimacy of their identities.

EDD’s Lack of Preparation Left it Unable to Effectively Address Two High Profile Situations

Because of fraud concerns, EDD directed Bank of America to freeze 344,000 debit cards (accounts) that it uses to provide claimants with benefit payments. However, EDD did not have a plan to ensure that it could selectively unfreeze accounts belonging to legitimate claimants, has been slow to provide clear information about its role in freezing these accounts, and does not have a full understanding of which accounts are frozen. Additionally, EDD was unprepared to prevent payment for fraudulent claims filed under the names of incarcerated individuals—which it estimated to total about $810 million. EDD had told the Legislature for years that it was considering adopting a cross‑match between claim and incarceration data. However, because it had not developed the capacity to match data between its claims system and the data from state and local correctional facilities, it did not detect these fraudulent claims until after the fact.

EDD Has Relied on Uninformed and Disjointed Techniques to Prevent Impostor Fraud

EDD has not established a centralized unit that is responsible for managing its fraud detection efforts, and it does not reliably track potential fraudulent activity from detection to resolution. As a result, EDD’s UI program is at a higher risk for fraud. Further, it does not monitor or assess its numerous fraud prevention and detection tools to determine whether they are successful in mitigating fraud. Consequently, EDD may well be using ineffective fraud prevention and detection techniques and delaying payments to legitimate claimants while it puts their claims through additional and unmerited review.

Summary of Recommendations


To protect against fraudulent UI claims, the Legislature should amend state law to require EDD to regularly cross‑match its claims against data from state and local correctional facilities.

To ensure that EDD effectively protects the integrity of the UI program, the Legislature should amend state law to require EDD to, by January 2022, and biannually thereafter, assess the effectiveness of its fraud prevention and detection tools, eliminate those that are not effective, and reduce duplication in its efforts.


To ensure that it does not suspend critical safeguards, EDD should plan in advance which UI fraud prevention and detection mechanisms it can adjust during recessions to effectively balance timely payment with fraud prevention.

To provide timely access to benefits for legitimate UI claimants with frozen accounts, EDD should immediately obtain and review a comprehensive listing of benefit accounts that are frozen and, by March 2021, begin the process of unfreezing legitimate accounts.

To ensure that it can approach UI fraud prevention in a comprehensive and coordinated manner, EDD should do the following:

Agency Comments

EDD stated that it undeniably struggled to timely distribute benefits to the millions of newly unemployed Californians and simultaneously prevent fraudulent claims. It agreed with all of our recommendations and indicated that it will implement them all.

Back to top